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 “When you look at the infrastructure here, we should be miles ahead. 
But there’s so much ﬂ uﬀ  money, no hard talk, NGOs propping 
businesses up—it kills it.” 
 — Nikolai Barnwell, in a Wired article 
by Jessica Hatcher, June 10, 2014 
 “Yes, my good people, I said it. It was NGO ‘ﬂ uﬀ ’ money that 
funded what we do today.” 
 — Sam Gichuru in a blog post, June 10,  2014 
 Introduction 
 Back in 2014, a debate swept through the Kenyan tech sector about the 
value of grant funding for start-ups based on new technology. Swirling 
around the blogosphere, among Kenyans on Twitter, and entrepreneurs 
in the thick of it, the debate seemed to boil down to the question of 
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whether grants from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donor 
 organizations interested in funding social enterprises in Kenya were a ben-
efi t or a hindrance. Put in less secular terms, many asked: Is grant funding 
a blessing or a curse? Key fi gures, like Nikolai Barnwell, at that time the 
manager of the technology business incubator 88mph, 1 and Sam Gichuru, 
the manager of Nailab (a competing tech incubator), landed on one side or 
the other of the debate. Even now, more than a year after the debate peaked 
in social media, its question still lingers over Kenyan entrepreneurs. 
 Seen through the lens of this debate, the presence of grant funding, or 
more generally the presence of nonprofi t organizations, seems black and 
white. It is either good for the growth of the sector or it is not; it either spurs 
innovation or it does not. In this chapter, my goal is to take this debate 
and reframe it in more constructive, less binary terms. I hope to do this by 
introducing a new lens through which to look at technology companies in 
Kenya, the lens of cultural theory. I will use this lens to make the case that 
the future of Kenyan technology innovation lies in the mixing of nonprofi t 
and for-profi t cultures in the sector and not in a battle between the two. 
 By culture, I refer not to national or ethnic cultures, but to cultures 
understood more broadly as a set of beliefs, practices, and assumptions 
of a particular group, whether that group is based around an organiza-
tion, a nation, or even around an idea. Looking just at the culture of 
organizations—for good or ill—the Kenyan tech sector is an exceedingly 
multicultural place. Th ere are large international for-profi t tech com-
panies like IBM and Google; international and domestic investors like 
Savannah Fund, Emerging Capital Partners, and Impact Amplifi er; aspir-
ing Kenyans and other East Africans entrepreneurs; donor organizations 
like the World Bank, Omidyar Foundation, and Hivos Foundation; social 
enterprises; public–private partnerships; and countless others. For most 
researchers who study culture (and this group is large and disparate), cul-
ture is understood to rarely be stagnant. It is prone to change, to evolve 
over time (Runciman  2005 ), and to undergo hybridization, 2 particularly 
in multicultural places (Kraidy  2005 ) like the Kenyan tech sector. 
1  In this chapter, I will refer to the organization as 88mph, even though it has been renamed 
Nairobi Garage, because the name change occurred after most of the research for this chapter had 
been conducted. 
2  When speaking about culture, the term hybridization is typically used by academics to refer to the 
mixing of two separate cultural groups. A good example of this is the case of second-generation 
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 In this chapter, I look at nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations and 
approaches to the work of technology development as forms of organiza-
tional culture. If we accept that cultures adapt and change in the presence 
of one another, it becomes easier, more intuitive, to see how changing 
forms of work and organizational structures are a natural result of the 
Kenyan tech sector’s multiculturalism. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide some background on 
the theories of organizational culture and cultural hybridity. I will lay out 
what, according to existing research, traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t 
organizational cultures look like, drawing in particular from Schein’s 
theory of the levels of organizational culture (Schein  1990 ). I will use 
this picture to construct a typology of the two diff erent types of organiza-
tional culture. I will then demonstrate how two individual organizations 
at the center of the Kenyan tech sector are cultural hybrids—whether 
that hybridity is intentional or not—that to varying extents adopt and 
adapt underlying cultural assumptions, espoused beliefs, and practices 
from both traditions. 
 Th e two organizations are the technology hub iHub and the technol-
ogy incubator 88mph. 3 As mentors to entrepreneurs, the incubators and 
tech hubs in Kenya act as role models for fl edgling start-ups. Whether 
these start-ups are successful or not, the example that the incubators and 
hubs set through the cultural models they themselves adopt could have 
an infl uence on how aspiring entrepreneurs approach their work in the 
future and what future organizations in the industry look like. Th is is 
primarily a comparative case-study analysis; the data used in the chap-
ter were drawn from ethnographic fi eldwork conducted by the author 
in Nairobi in the summers of 2013 and 2014, predominantly at iHub 
but with site visits to and interviews conducted at 88mph. Data are also 
members of a diaspora group (e.g., Nigerian-Americans or Somalis living in London) who retain 
some of their home culture but adopt much of the cultural practices and even beliefs of their new 
host country as well. 
3  Small-business incubators are understood by management scholars to be organizations designed 
to accelerate the growth of entrepreneurial businesses. Frequently, they off er a physical space and 
an intense training program, as well as access to capital to help businesses grow. Tech hubs, while 
less clearly defi ned, are, like incubators, typically designed to nurture entrepreneurial businesses but 
in less formal ways. Th ey typically provide communal space and focus on network building in order 
to foster the generation of new innovative ideas. Th ey do not provide direct funding. 
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drawn from an analysis of the discourse and rhetoric used by representa-
tives of both organizations publicly and in interviews with the author. 
 Th e two organizations chosen are often seen as representing opposite 
sides of the nonprofi t–for-profi t debate in Kenya, because iHub was built 
initially on grant funding from nonprofi t organizations, like the Omidyar 
Foundation, and 88mph was built initially by a pool of for-profi t inves-
tors. By using these contrasting examples, I hope to demonstrate the dif-
ferent ways that cultural hybridity are manifesting within organizations 
in the sector. By using the method of in-depth case studies, I will explore 
some of the internal dilemmas that this hybridity causes and how these 
two organizations have managed it in very diff erent ways. 
 Th e mixing of nonprofi t and for-profi t beliefs and practices gives the 
Kenyan tech sector access to more and diff erent resources, resources that 
must be managed carefully and conscientiously. By looking closely at 
how existing organizations are managing this hybridity, my hope is that 
we can develop strategies for taking advantage of the multiculturalism 
that clearly exists in the Kenyan tech sector rather than fi ghting about 
whether it is good or bad. 
 Theoretical Grounding 
 Organizational Culture 
 When we think about the culture of an organization, somewhat vague 
but emotive concepts like “the way we do things around here” or “the 
way people interact with and treat one another” might come to mind. 
Scholars studying culture at organizations, particularly in the manage-
ment fi eld, have identifi ed four diff erent types of culture in and around 
organizations: (1) the cultural context (as in the national, geographic, 
or industrial cultures surrounding it), (2) cross-cutting cultures (as in 
the diff erent occupational or ethnic cultures of its employees), (3) sub-
cultures specifi c to the organization (as in the particular cultures of 
departments within the organization), and, and most important, for this 
chapter, and (4) organizational culture (the culture of the organization 
itself ) (Gregory  1983 ). Th ese types of culture are all certainly worthy of 
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greater investigation in the context of a multicultural environment like 
the Kenyan tech sector, but it is organizational culture that we are pri-
marily concerned with here. 
 Andrew Pettigrew, widely considered to be the grandfather of the study 
of organizational culture, provided a defi nition that began to clarify what 
the culture of an organization was. He defi ned it as an amalgamation 
of beliefs, identity, ritual, and myths (Pettigrew  1979 ) of an organiza-
tion. Th is defi nition, and in particular, the inclusion of the themes of 
beliefs and rituals, has greatly infl uenced those studying organizations, 
including prominent scholars like Geert Hofstede and those studying 
technology organizations, like Kathleen Gregory. In the 1990s, Edgar 
Schein, a professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, built on 
Pettigrew’s defi nition and constructed a useful framework for analyzing 
and identifying organizational culture. Th is framework is known as the 
three levels of organizational culture and includes: (1) basic underlying 
unspoken assumptions, (2) espoused beliefs and values, and (3) visible 
artifacts and behaviors (Schein  1990 ). Within each of these levels, Schein 
found important evidence of an organization’s culture, though each level 
required a diff erent method of research (e.g., analysis, interviews, and 
observations). 
 At the fi rst level, the underlying assumptions often reside in large-scale 
ideological, philosophical, or theological commitments; they are basic 
assumptions about how the world is, or more often the case, how it ought 
to be. Such commitments could be to a particular religion, for example, 
or to democracy, neoliberalism, capitalism, and so on. Because assump-
tions are just that—things that are assumed or taken for granted—they 
can be the most diffi  cult for researchers to pin down and require deep 
analysis. Yet, according to Schein, they are fundamental to how much of 
the rest of an organization’s culture is determined. 
 At the second level, the espoused beliefs and values are the views, articu-
lated by members of an organization, that guide its purpose and its struc-
ture. Th is level has received the most attention from scholars, because it 
is typically relatively easy to identify through interviews or in an organi-
zation’s manifestos and policy statements. Yet the beliefs and values are 
often greatly shaped by the ideological commitments and assumptions of 
the fi rst, and more elusive, level of underlying assumptions. 
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 And at the third level, the behaviors are the manners and customs of 
interaction between diff erent individuals and departments at an organi-
zation or how the organization behaves externally. And the artifacts are, 
according to Schein, “everything from the physical layout, the dress code, 
the manner in which people address each other, the smell and feel of the 
place, its emotional intensity, and other phenomena, to more permanent 
archival manifestations such as company records, products, statements of 
philosophy, and annual reports” (Schein  1990 ). In short, the artifacts are 
the material aspects of an organization’s culture and are typically under-
stood through direct observation. 
 Finally, an important part of Schein’s characterization of culture at 
organizations is that these three levels are not absolutely distinct; they 
feed into one another and comprise a more organic and ongoing process 
than the term “levels” can convey (Schein  2010 ). Underlying assump-
tions motivate, consciously or not, the central goals of an organization 
or the motivations of individuals for working there. And in turn, the 
organization’s core values and beliefs infl uence how they choose to struc-
ture themselves and how everyday operations take place (Greenwood 
and Hinings  1993 ). Google, for example, maintains an open-plan offi  ce 
and gives its employees time to work on their own projects (representing 
the artifacts of the third level) because of the espoused belief that such 
structural factors encourage more innovation and because of the under-
lying assumption that innovation is good for society. Th is interrelation-
ship between the various levels of culture is an important part of Schein’s 
framework and helps to visualize organizations as the organic fl uctuating 
entities that they are. 
 Organizational Hybrids 
 Th e conceptualization in Schein’s model of organizational culture as 
organic and fl uid is in keeping with a wider body of scholarship about 
culture and change. Scholars in cultural studies frequently describe cul-
ture as constantly evolving and being prone to hybridization, adaptation, 
and change in a myriad of ways (Gillespie  2010 ; Kraidy  2005 ). Th e evo-
lution of Sheng, the rich and unstructured linguistic hybrid of Kiswahili 
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and English used in Nairobi, is an example of a hybrid cultural artifact 
that emerged out of the close quarters in the city that brought many 
diff erent linguistic cultures into contact with one another. For scholars 
of organizations, hybrids are organizations that cross sectorial or institu-
tional boundaries or use core beliefs and practices from multiple organi-
zational types (Doherty et al.  2014 ; Mangen and Brivot  2014 ). A social 
enterprise is the quintessential example of a hybrid organization because 
it has both a social-impact purpose and a drive for fi nancial sustainability 
(Doherty et al.  2014 ), meaning that it is motivated by core beliefs from 
two diff erent sectors, the nonprofi t and the for-profi t sectors. 
 A prominent debate among researchers of organizations is whether 
hybrid organizations are stable and sustainable. For example, Greenwood 
and Hinings ( 1993 ) have argued that organizations tend to move toward 
a single set of core values and beliefs because of the internal confl ict 
caused by the presence of multiple potentially incompatible beliefs. 
Th is view of hybrid organizations as inherently unstable dominates the 
existing literature on organizations. However, more recent research car-
ried out in countries in the Global South has provided evidence that 
hybrid  organizations may actually be well suited to such environments. 
In Bolivia, Battilana and Dorado ( 2010 ) demonstrated that new organi-
zations that began as some kind of hybrid, like a social enterprise, had 
greater potential for sustainability than more established organizations 
seeking to change their organizational culture. For social enterprises 
in two diff erent African countries, Gupta et  al. ( 2015 ) made the case 
that hybrid organizations may actually be useful in resource-constrained 
environments. 
 By combining the theories of organizational culture and hybrids 
described above, I believe it is possible to attain a more holistic and 
nuanced sense of the construction of hybrid organizations that goes 
beyond the core beliefs typically examined. In the rest of this chapter, I 
use Schein’s framework of the levels of organizational culture: (1) to iden-
tify organizational culture at traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t organi-
zations and (2) to examine how iHub and 88mph, two organizations in 
the Kenyan technology sector, are to varying extents organizational cul-
tural hybrids that have adopted beliefs, practices, and even assumptions 
from both traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational cultures. 
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 Nonprofi t and For-Profi t Organizational 
Cultures 
 At a basic level, the diff erence between nonprofi t and for-profi t organi-
zations may seem self-evident, even tautological—one has the goal of 
generating profi t, and one does not. Right? Going back to the original 
debate about what is good for the Kenyan technology sector, these two 
have certainly been painted as contrasting, even oppositional, types. A 
brief return to the literature here, using Schein’s levels of organizational 
culture, will help provide a more holistic and nuanced view. 
 Most of the research on organizational culture has been done by man-
agement scholars and has focused predominantly on culture at for- profi ts. 
Th e research was typically of the overarching variety, working to build 
generalized theories that might explain or predict organizational behavior 
as a whole across many varied organizations. Th e majority of these studies 
also focused exclusively on for-profi t companies and often on the role of 
leadership in encouraging the growth of a “strong” organizational cul-
ture (Bass and Avolio  1993 ; Clement  1994 ; Ogbonna and Harris  2000 ). 
However, there have also been a number of narrower studies looking at 
the particular iterations of organizational culture in unique types of orga-
nizations, like family-run manufacturing fi rms in the USA (Zahra  2003 ), 
Japanese fi rms (Deshpandé et al.  1993 ), multinational companies (Jaeger 
 1983 ), service sector companies (Chatman and Jehn  1994 ), and Silicon 
Valley companies (Gregory  1983 ), among many others. 
 Th ere have been fewer studies looking at the concept of organizational 
culture in the particular context of nonprofi t organizations. Tierney’s 
study ( 1988 ) of higher education institutions is one such example, as 
is Murta’s study ( 2011 ) of a nonprofi t organization in El Paso, Texas. 
Many of these studies were intended to advise nonprofi ts on how to build 
a more effi  cient and innovative organizational culture resembling those 
with the strength that many researchers see in the culture of for-profi t 
organizations (Dartington  1998 ; Lindenberg  2001 ). Similarly, although 
they do not refer specifi cally to organizational culture, recent studies by 
Hwang and Powell as well as Watkins and colleagues have addressed many 
of the cultural elements of nonprofi ts, including levels of professionalism 
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(Hwang and Powell  2009 ) in the nonprofi t sector in San Francisco and 
the organizational goals and material technology employed by interna-
tional development NGOs (Watkins et al.  2012 ). 
 A handful of studies have looked comparatively at aspects of culture 
of nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations. One such study was conducted 
by Hull and Lio ( 2006 ) of the Rochester Institute of Technology in 
New York. Th ey outlined the ways in which cultures diff ered between 
the two organizations. Th ey broke down these diff erences into three core 
components of the organization: vision, strategic constraints, and fi nan-
cial constraints. Other scholars, like Billis ( 2010 ), have contrasted for- 
profi t and nonprofi t organizations as follows: private-sector organizations 
are determined by their market orientation to maximize fi nancial return, 
with ownership by shareholders and a revenue model based on sales and 
fees, whereas nonprofi t-sector organizations are determined by their 
social and environmental goals, with ownership by members and the pri-
vate election of representatives, staffi  ng by a combination of employees 
and volunteers, and a revenue model based on membership fees, dona-
tions, and legacies (Billis  2010 ). 
 Table  10.1 uses the information acquired from the studies of culture 
at nonprofi t and for-profi t organizations described above and fi ts it into 
Schein’s levels of organizational culture framework, thus creating a typol-
ogy of the organizational culture of traditional nonprofi t and for-profi t 
organizations.
 Th e fi rst level, that of underlying assumptions, is rarely covered in the 
literature. As a result, the table draws from underlying assumptions embed-
ded in the literature itself and fi ndings from the author’s own ethnographic 
fi eldwork. Underlying assumptions includes an organization’s underlying 
priorities in society and ideological commitments. Th e second level, that of 
espoused beliefs and values, has received the most attention from research-
ers and thus is the most comprehensively represented of the three levels. It 
includes an organization’s goals, scope of impact on society, and ground-
ing in society. Finally, the third level, that observed artifacts and behaviors, 
includes an organization’s strategies for revenue generation, who an organi-
zation is responsible to, and an organization’s ownership structure. However, 
it excludes a number of more specifi c elements of artifacts, such as an orga-
nization’s layout or the habits of  interaction between various departments, 
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in order to focus on the most salient categories for understanding the diff er-
ences between nonprofi t and for- profi t organizational cultures. 
 Although this composite may seem a tad cumbersome, I believe it to 
be a worthwhile improvement over existing literature, which rarely looks 
at organizational culture holistically and instead focuses more narrowly 
on the level of beliefs and values or solely at an organization’s structures. 
 Th e core diff erences between nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational 
cultures as outlined here originate at the base level of underlying assump-
tions. Th e assumptions about what is good for society and what kind of 
socioeconomic system is best seem to stand in stark contrast with one 
another. For-profi ts typically rely on an ideological commitment to the 
 Table 10.1  Organizational culture at traditional nonprofi ts and for-profi ts 
 Levels of organizational 
culture 
 Categories of organizational culture 
 For-profi ts  Nonprofi ts 
 Underlying assumptions 
 Underlying societal 
level priorities 




 Free market economy  Philanthropic economy 
 Espoused beliefs and values 
 Goal/vision  Revolves around how to 
maximize profi ts while 
providing the services 
they are designed for 
 To maximize positive social 
change; vision forms core 
of organization’s work 
 Scope of societal 
impact 
 Societal impact considered 
to the extent that it 
affects profi t generation 
 Seeking to bring about 
social change in society 
 Geographical 
grounding 
 Flexible, able to relocate, 
or expand of necessary for 
profi t 
 Committed to the 
location(s) in which they 
operate 
 Observed artifacts and behaviors 
 Ownership structure  Shareholders  Donor support, members 
 Responsible to  Shareholders and, to a 
lesser extent, employees 
 Donors, employees, 
volunteers, intended 
benefi ciaries 
 Revenue generation  Seeks revenue 
maximization through 
sales and fees 
 Donor support, project 
revenue goes to improving 
service 
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free-market economy, where the logic of the market is the best way to 
build a better, more economically prosperous world. By contrast, non-
profi t companies are typically built on the assumption that the market is 
not enough—that there are important aspects of the social world that the 
fi nancial markets are not designed to improve or support, such as poverty 
eradication or social welfare. 
 Th ese contrasting underlying assumptions and ideological commit-
ments trickle down to infl uence the culture of an organization at the other 
two levels. At the level of espoused beliefs and values, for example, the 
goals of a typical for-profi t revolve around the maximization of profi ts, 
driven by the belief in the free-market system. Even when there is a strong 
commitment to the particular service being provided (for example, a great 
search engine or the best mobile taxi application), it is believed that the 
service cannot be provided sustainably without a profi t-driven revenue 
model. By contrast, the assumption that some social problems cannot be 
addressed within a free-market system drives nonprofi t organizations to 
put the goal of maximizing positive social change at the forefront. 
 In turn, both the underlying assumptions and the core beliefs infl u-
ence the behavior and artifacts of an organization. For the typical for- 
profi t, for example, their stakeholders are largely made up of shareholders 
(and to a lesser extent, other individuals such as clients), whereas for the 
typical nonprofi t, a large and diverse array of individuals must be kept in 
mind, ranging from the intended benefi ciaries of the nonprofi t’s social- 
impact work to the donors who support it and the individuals who give 
their time freely or for reduced pay. 
 Case Studies: iHUB and 88MPH 
 In this section, I use the two contrasting typologies of organizational cul-
ture outlined above to illustrate that two key organizations in the Kenyan 
technology sector, the incubator 88mph and the technology hub iHub, 
are hybrids of the two cultures and that the hybridity of organizational 
culture can take quite diff erent forms. 
 Th e incubator and hub were chosen for this study because, as nurturers 
of emerging companies, they are potentially serving as cultural models 
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for the organizations they are helping to build and for the individuals 
they are helping to train. I chose 88mph and iHub for the specifi c case 
studies to illustrate Kenya’s incubators and tech hubs. iHub has been 
described as the fi rst tech hub in Africa, and its role as a trendsetter makes 
it an important illustrative choice. 88mph (now called Nairobi Garage) 
is a start-up incubator that adopted a for-profi t model popular in Silicon 
Valley at the time it originally opened in Nairobi. Th ere are a fair number 
of other incubators and hubs in Kenya, but, as I will demonstrate, iHub 
and 88mph serve as useful points of comparison when the topic of inter-
est is the hybridity of nonprofi t and for-profi t organizational culture. 
 Artifacts and Behaviors 
 Beginning with the typologies associated with the third level of organi-
zational culture, artifacts and behaviors (Table  10.1 ), iHub largely aligns 
with the nonprofi ts and 88mph with the for-profi ts. In terms of owner-
ship structure, iHub was originally founded by Erik Hersman and Juliana 
Rotich, part of the team that made the software company Ushahidi 
famous. iHub received initial fi nancial support from donor organi-
zations, such as the Omidyar Network and Hivos Foundation, and is 
guided by a dedicated local advisory board that includes Bitange Ndemo, 
the former permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Information and 
Communication, and Becky Wanjiku, the Kenyan chief executive offi  cer 
(CEO) of Fireside Communications Limited. iHub’s business model at 
this point relies on partnerships with Internet providers (e.g., Zuku and 
Safaricom) that have supplied iHub with free Wi-Fi access to help nur-
ture the sector and on international tech companies, like IBM, Microsoft, 
and Google, that helped fi nance many of iHub’s popular events, includ-
ing networking events and trainings from experts. Its model of revenue 
generation has been based mostly on hosting these kinds of events in its 
large, open-plan space (akin to a Google-style space) on fi nancing from 
donors, membership dues collected from developers and techies who use 
the space, and conducting paid research. iHub has been able to keep 
some of its expenses down through many of its partnerships (e.g., the free 
Wi-Fi supplied by partners). 
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 As in the case of traditional nonprofi ts, to whom iHub is responsible is 
not straightforward, but it is clear from interviews and observations that 
the core of its commitment is to a community grounded in Nairobi. In an 
interview, Hersman illustrated the integral role he believes members of the 
community have played in the origins of iHub and in sustaining its contin-
ued success, saying, “Even before there was a space we had an advisory board 
of people from the community. So we actually knew people from that com-
munity. We’re part of that community, so it’s easier. ... Before we even had 
any paint on the wall, we had dozens of volunteers” (Duarte  2012 ). 
 Th e meaning of community espoused by Hersman and most prevalent 
among members of iHub has many layers. It seems fi rst and foremost 
to be a community of techies and developers who use the space to work 
on their businesses, but more broadly, it can be seen as the many varied 
individuals who have dedicated themselves to the idea of strengthening 
the iHub community and strengthening the ability of Kenya to become 
a hub for tech innovation in Africa. Th is community includes organiza-
tions and individuals from outside of Kenya who have a genuine interest 
in supporting the growth of the sector in one way or another, including 
its funders and its many numerous partners. In short, iHub’s commit-
ment seems to be to the success of the community. 
 Th e behavior and structure of 88mph is more in line with the for-profi t 
typology. Founded by a European serial entrepreneur, Kresten Buch, who 
came out of Stanford Business School in the USA, 88mph describes itself 
on its website as a seed fund that invests in, and connects investors to, 
particular start-ups nurtured during a three-month accelerator program. 
It resembles in many ways the incubator programs in Silicon Valley, like 
Y-Combinator, that provide intensive training and mentorship dur-
ing their accelerator programs and connect successful entrepreneurs to 
potential investors. Th e key employees at 88mph are also shareholders, 
encouraging a sense of personal stake in ensuring these start-ups grow 
and profi t. When it fi rst opened, Buch and many of 88mph’s initiating 
staff  were new to the Kenyan context and most of their investors were 
foreigners. Over the next few years, they worked to engage more with 
local actors, and by 2012, 11 of their 17 investors were from East Africa. 
 88mph has currently put its accelerator program on hold while it 
focuses on its existing start-ups rather than diversifying with new ones. 
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But they still maintain a group of “entrepreneurs in residence” from 
countries around the world who are intended to serve as mentors for 
the new entrepreneurs in Nairobi and at its other, newer offi  ces in Cape 
Town and Lagos. As a for-profi t company, 88mph’s model for revenue 
generation (see Table  10.1 ) is to invest in the very early-stage start-ups it 
mentors, including taking 7 percent equity in the fl edgling companies. 
As Buch said in 2012, “Th e only way we can make money is if the start-
 up does really well” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Th e company conforms to the 
model of the majority of incubators in Silicon Valley, that is, for-profi t at 
its core and incorporating the potential for high risk in the short term in 
the hopes of a high return in the long term. 
 Again, in keeping with the traditional model of incubators and accel-
erator programs around the world and with the for-profi t typology 
shown in Table  10.1 , 88mph is primarily responsible to the investors 
who have supported it and who have invested in the start-ups. It also 
has a second responsibility to help the start-ups build fi nancially success-
ful companies, which feeds back into the goal of helping investors get 
a return on their investment. 88mph has made a point of bringing in 
Kenyan investors; the start-ups it nurtures in its Nairobi offi  ce are led by 
Kenyan or East African entrepreneurs, as well as a handful of foreign-led 
endeavors. Nonetheless, 88mph is not as embedded in the local Nairobi 
context as is iHub, which is particularly apparent through the multiple 
offi  ces it has in Africa and in the level of espoused belief in wanting 
to “invest in technologies that solve problems for emerging markets” 
(CNBC Africa  2012 ). 
 Espoused Beliefs and Underlying Assumptions 
 Th e two organizations begin to overlap in notable ways when we look 
at the organizational culture embedded in their espoused beliefs and 
underlying assumptions, the second level of Schein’s framework (see 
Table  10.1 ). As noted above, in the area of geographic grounding, they 
remain quite distinct. iHub has a clear commitment to growing the tech 
sector specifi cally in Nairobi and is highly integrated into that location, 
whereas 88mph is more fl exible and could shift its attention to another 
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offi  ce, like the one in Lagos, if the potential for a higher return on invest-
ment seemed more likely. Th at said, the involvement of local Kenyan 
and East African investors in 88mph projects means that many of the 
individuals in the organization now have a geographic commitment to 
Kenya. As Buch has said, “We need to understand the local market, so 
having local people come to advise and local investors is very important. 
We want to build those partnerships” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Beyond the 
geographic relationship, it is in the other aspects of organizational culture 
at the level of beliefs and values as well as at the level of the core underly-
ing  assumptions that we see the original distinctions between nonprofi ts 
and for- profi ts begin to break down in iHub and 88mph and their orga-
nizational culture hybridize. 
 iHub still fi ts within the nonprofi t type to a large extent within the 
level of espoused beliefs. Its members frequently use the language of 
positive social change when talking about iHub’s goal of supporting the 
growth of the local technology community and locally designed technol-
ogy in Kenya. More specifi cally, a number of the projects it helps to nur-
ture and support also have clear social-impact objectives, like AkiraChix, 
which trains women to use technology and to program, or like the start-
 up M-Farm, which nurtures growth in the agricultural sector by bring-
ing market price information to farmers. Nonetheless, it is notable that 
while its own fi nancial model is nonprofi t, many of the organizations 
that have emerged from the iHub space are for-profi t companies, some of 
which have built products that target the business-to-business market—
in which nonprofi t organizations have rarely been involved. Moreover, 
on its website, iHub describes one of its goals as creating “the place where 
seeds are planted and are easily found by the people with the money to 
help them grow.” Th is mix of for-profi t and nonprofi t actors and funders 
is something that iHub has actively nurtured and that its leaders actively 
espouse. For example, in a 2014 post on his blog, WhiteAfrican, Hersman 
wrote clearly defending the role that nonprofi t grant funding has played 
in supporting early-stage development in the Kenyan technology sector 
(Hersman  2014 ). But he has also emphasized his belief that many pri-
vate companies see a “real viable opportunity” in the start-up ecosystem 
around the iHub space (Design Indaba  2014 ). Herman’s choice to high-
light the role of private companies as well as nonprofi t organizations in 
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his public interviews demonstrates the belief that iHub’s mission is not 
exclusively a nonprofi t one. 
 Th is goal of supporting the growth of a private sector, albeit a sec-
tor that the iHub team believes has the potential to aff ect social change, 
is atypical compared with traditional nonprofi t organizational culture. 
It speaks to the important ways in which iHub diverges from the non-
profi t type at the level of underlying assumptions (Table  10.1 ). iHub 
does resemble the nonprofi t type in assuming that the work it is doing 
will help to empower the disadvantaged and reduce inequality. Where 
it diff ers is in its ideological commitment to building a successful and 
sustainable market economy for technology in Kenya. Many of its indi-
vidual staff  members, including its founders, appear to believe that non-
profi t involvement has an important role to play in the early stages of 
the growth of the sector and of start-ups, but the belief that underlies 
this is that the growth of a for-profi t tech sector can aff ect positive social 
change. At this base level of organizational culture, iHub represents a real 
hybridization of the characteristically for-profi t commitment to the free 
market economy and the nonprofi t commitment to philanthropic inter-
vention where needed. 
 In the case of 88mph, the typology at the level of underlying assumptions 
(see Table  10.1 ) is less ambiguous than for iHub. Th ere is a clear underlying 
commitment to a free-market economy and profi t generation akin to the 
typical for-profi t. Th e way it measure its impact, for example, is a “pure, 
simple, bottom-line kind of investment” with “really no other impact met-
rics” (Barnwell  2014 ). At times, members of 88mph have been outspoken 
critics of the reliance on nonprofi t grant funding in the sector (Hatcher 
 2014 ). In a 2014 interview with Th e Ideal Space, Nikolai Barnwell, then 
the manager of the 88mph Nairobi offi  ce, described his vision of where he 
wanted to see 88mph in the future, summing up up how the organization’s 
commitments to profi t and to a free-market economy have translated to 
the goals that its employees espouse. “In a few years,” Barnwell said, “hope-
fully we will have invested in 100 start-ups across the continent, helped 
people make some cool start-ups, and our investors have made a lot of 
money” (Njiru  2014 ). Th ese goals of creating “cool” technology as well as 
creating wealth resemble those of many in the tech sector in Silicon Valley. 
Members of 88mph have also articulated a desire to stay away from purely 
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social enterprises because they perceive them as “easily dismissed as things 
around NGOs which are largely ineff ective” (Barnwell  2014 ), a perception 
that appears to be drawn from an underlying belief that social enterprises 
are unlikely to lead to any profi table return on investment, in keeping with 
the assumptions of the for-profi t typology. 
 Nonetheless, there are subtle ways in which social impact has crept into 
some of the language, or the espoused beliefs (see Table  10.1 ), used by 
individuals at 88mph. In describing his own motivation, Buch explained, 
“I would love to work with people who really want to change the world. 
Who want to leave the nice corporate job and go down in salary to try 
to solve a problem” (CNBC Africa  2012 ). Th is language of “changing 
the world” is typical of that employed by many for-profi t start-ups and 
incubators in Silicon Valley, where each is trying to prove that theirs is 
the next big idea that will change the world and therefore is deserving of 
support from investors. Nonetheless, 88mph’s decision to focus on the 
emerging economies of African countries seems to go beyond the work 
of “changing the world” that many in the American tech sector believe 
they are doing by creating the next dating app or smart watch. Although 
employees at 88mph still readily admit that profi t generation for their 
investors is their primary goal, local job creation and regional economic 
growth are side eff ects that they routinely acknowledge or even highlight. 
 For example, when speaking with me, Barnwell acknowledged that 
while their primary goal is supporting the growth of their start-ups, ide-
ally all of the people those start-ups hire “will be locally located so that 
it builds jobs” (Barnwell  2014 ). Local job creation was, in fact, the most 
frequently cited of the company’s impacts beyond profi t generation. Even 
if 88mph employees shy away from or even criticize the term “social 
impact” (Mulupi  2012 ), there is some acknowledgment of the potential 
for 88mph’s work to have a wider economic impact. And although many 
for-profi t companies are highlighting these kinds of positive externalities, 
particularly with the rise of the corporate social-responsibility movement, 
it shows how social-impact language has begun to infl uence the beliefs 
that for-profi t incubators in this sector, like 88mph, are articulating. 
 Th e following fi gures depict the diff erences between the two cul-
tural typologies as a continuum for assumptions, beliefs, and artifacts, 
 representing each level of organizational culture described in Table  10.1 . 
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Based on the above analysis, I have placed iHub and 88mph on these 
continuums. Th e fi gures certainly oversimplify the cultural complexities 
at both of these organizations, and the positions chosen for them are not 
hard and fast. Rather, the fi gures are simply intended to illustrate that 
although both of these organizations are hybrids, their hybridity takes 
very diff erent forms (Figs.  10.1 and  10.2 ).
 At the level of behaviors, iHub’s structure makes it responsible to a 
wide array of actors in the community to which it is committed, while 
88mph’s primary responsibility is to its investors. At the level of beliefs, 
they share the goal of supporting the growth of tech start-ups in Kenya, 
though iHub’s motivation for that seems to revolve more around the 
social impact of such growth while 88mph’s lies more in the generation 
of profi t and perhaps also regional economic growth and job creation. 
And at the level of assumptions, they seem to have more in common with 
a mutual, unspoken commitment to the growth of a free-market econ-
omy around the Kenyan tech sector, a notable area where iHub seems to 












 With such a diverse array of organizations present in the Kenyan tech 
sector, 88mph and iHub are exposed to many organizations that they 
might draw on for inspiration. In the globally connected ecosystem of the 
technology sector, they are also connected to organizational cultures from 
beyond Kenya, including the organizational culture of Silicon Valley to 
name but one. It may be that some hybrid composite of nonprofi t and 
for-profi t organizational culture, combined with some of these other 
organizational cultures (e.g., Silicon Valley tech culture or Kenyan busi-
ness culture) not explored in this chapter, may become the norm for 
the Kenyan tech sector. I believe it is still too early to say. What can be 
deduced at this stage, I suggest, is simply that these two organizations 
have decided that adopting cultural beliefs and practices from at least two 
diff erent organizational cultural types is the best way for them to operate 
in the current Kenyan tech sector. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have made the case that in order for progress to take 
place in the Kenyan technology sector, we need to move beyond the stale 
debate about whether nonprofi t grant funding is good or bad and instead 
fi nd ways to take advantage of the multiculturalism that exists in the sec-
tor. In order to do this, I have drawn on existing theories about culture at 
organizations to demonstrate that even organizations like 88mph, often 
associated with the for-profi t model that dominates the discourse, are not 
purely for-profi t when they are examined more holistically using the lens 
of cultural theory. By using Schein’s theory of the three levels of organi-
zational culture—underlying assumptions, espoused beliefs and values, 
and observed artifacts and behaviors—I have demonstrated in a more 
nuanced way that cultural hybridity exists at key organizations in Kenya’s 
technology sector and that the practices and behaviors of these organiza-
tions are shaped by their fundamental underlying assumptions. 
 Th e cultural reality at iHub and 88mph is certainly even more com-
plex and more fl uid than was presented in this chapter. Organizations 
are essentially living ecosystems; they have many individuals within 
them who maintain various kinds of relationships across individuals, 
10 Organizational Cultural Hybrids 321
 departments, job descriptions, and time. Th ey are also, like the hybrid 
language Sheng, continuously evolving and adopting to diff erent con-
texts, needs, and beliefs. Th e goal of this chapter was not to paint a com-
prehensive picture of all of the cultural infl uences at 88mph and iHub 
but to illustrate that these organizations are more complex than their 
revenue models might suggest. 
 Implications 
 For Kenya 
 Acceptance of this hybridization could have important implications 
for the future of technology companies in Kenya. A more hybridized 
organizational culture at the incubators and hubs—organizations that 
nurture the newly emerging technology start-ups of Kenya—could 
lead to more hybridity in the organizational culture at the start-ups 
themselves. In a sector that is riding on the potential of such start-ups 
to build the country’s future tech industry, the choices that entrepre-
neurs and start- up managers make about organizational culture early 
on could have the potential to infl uence the growth of this promising 
industry. Accepting that this hybridity already exists is a key step in 
fi ndings ways to take advantage of it and to work with it creatively and 
conscientiously. 
 Beyond Kenya 
 I would argue that the intermingling of nonprofi t and for-profi t culture 
observed at iHub and 88mph is refl ective of larger trends of overlap 
between these two sectors, not only in Kenya, but also in other parts 
of African and the Global South. Public–private partnerships, micro- 
fi nance for development, and social-impact investing have all been 
growing trends over the last 15 years in many countries in the Global 
South. In countries like Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, not only are non-
profi ts and international donors investing in start-ups,  something that 
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would have been hard to fi nd fi ve or ten years ago, but they are also 
adopting some of the language, and perhaps even the beliefs, of the for-
profi t sector. Th is may be seen in a focus on “sustainability,” “agribusi-
ness,” or testing new “business models,” like the World Bank’s infoDev 
project, or in committing to “sustainable economic development” as a 
core pillar of an organization’s work, as Hivos Foundation has done. 
Similarly, in ways akin to the experience of 88mph, many for-prof-
its operating in Kenya and other parts of Africa have begun adopt-
ing some of the more social-impact- focused goals and visions typically 
associated with nonprofi ts into the language they use to explain their 
work. Multinationals are particularly good examples of this, with some, 
including IBM, Google, and Microsoft, frequently articulating a desire 
to help “build local capacity” in Africa, as in IBM’s commitment to 
“encourage[ing] and strengthen[ing] an innovation culture” in its work 
in Kenya (citizen IBM  2012 ). 
 Furthermore, the review of the theories of organizational culture and 
hybridity provided in this chapter illustrated the existing literature’s 
weakness at explaining the behavior and structure of new organizations 
in emerging economies in the Global South and particularly the role 
of hybrid organizations in these spaces. Th e existing literature, largely 
built from studies in the USA and Europe, sees hybrid organizations as 
inherently unstable. Work from scholars like Battilana, Gupta, and their 
colleagues, as well as the case studies provided here, provides early indica-
tions that the opposite might in fact be true in countries in the Global 
South, or at the very least that such hybridity is a potentially more natural 
part of the development of economies in the Global South. 
 Recommendations for Practitioners 
 I want to off er a few recommendations for practitioners working in the 
Kenyan tech sector and in technology innovation in multicultural envi-
ronments in general that have come out of the research conducted for 
this chapter. Th ese recommendatons are: (1) to embrace hybridity, (2) 
to think holistically about culture at an organization, and (3) to consider 
hybrid individuals for employment. 
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 Embrace Hybridity 
 In multicultural environments, I would recommend embracing the 
hybridity that multiculturalism might lead to, but be well-informed 
about the diff erent kinds of culture that are infl uencing your work. Are 
you located in a cultural environment very diff erent from the ones in 
which you have worked before? Perhaps in such environments it makes 
sense to adopt some of the cultural practices of the new environment into 
your organizational culture even if such practices have not been a part of 
your operations in other environments. Th inking about these practices 
as an element of fl uid, evolving culture helps to embrace such hybridity 
and change over time as a natural part of organizations. Are there diff er-
ent cultural groups within your organizations that are creating divisions? 
One reason hybrid organizations are often believed to be unstable is that 
the hybridity is a result of the attempt to mix diff erent cultural groups in 
one organization, which often leads to confl ict between the groups. Such 
cultural mixing does not necessarily need to be avoided, but communica-
tion between such groups should be proactively managed. 
 Think Holistically 
 I would also recommend thinking holistically about the culture at an 
organization beyond just the choice of revenue model and to embrace the 
fl uidity that comes with looking at culture and not just at the structure 
of one’s organization. Although the debate about whether to accept grant 
funding or venture capital funding is very much alive among entrepre-
neurs in Kenya, it focuses on a small piece of the puzzle. Entrepreneurs 
should consider very carefully the choices they make about not just their 
revenue model, but also the myriad other aspects of organizational culture 
that they adopt. When designing the structure of a new company, what 
templates are being used to infl uence it? Incubators? Peer competitors? 
Successful foreign companies? If the latter, how diff erent is the market 
those companies succeeded in from the one you are in? Purposeful, con-
scientious attention to understanding why particular elements of culture 
are being adopted could go a long way to helping fl edgling  organizations 
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stay committed to their goals and retain a sense of organizational coher-
ence even when adopting cultural practices from multiple diff erent orga-
nizational cultures. 
 Consider Hybrid Individuals 
 Once the cultural hybridity in a multicultural sector is embraced, it 
becomes easier to develop tangible strategies for managing an organiza-
tion’s cultural hybridity, such as hiring hybrid individuals. Th ere is some 
evidence from the literature that hybrid individuals—individuals who 
have experience working in more than one kind of organizational cul-
ture—are particularly adept at switching between the two cultures or 
combining them. Th ink, for example, of individuals with dual national-
ity and experience living in two or more countries. Th ey are typically 
able to adapt and blend into each country far more easily than a for-
eigner who might have to learn a new language or who might falter on 
even such basic things as the appropriate way to greet an elder. In their 
work in Bolivia, Battilana and Dorado ( 2010 ) demonstrated that new 
hybrid organizations benefi tted from hiring employees with experience 
in the various cultures that the new organizations represented. Much 
more research needs to be carried out in order to better understand the 
roles these individuals might play, but the potential for hybrid individu-
als within hybrid organizations is one way in which embracing hybridity 
can have practical consequences. 
 Recommendations for Researchers 
 Finally, one of the goals of this chapter was to lay the groundwork for 
research on culture and organizations in technology sectors in African 
economies. Recommendations for avenues of research in this area 
include: (1) examining the stability or sustainability of organizations with 
hybrid cultures in the sector, (2) studying the ways in which the culture 
of organizations in the sector are changing over time, (3) problematizing 
the infl uence of other forms of culture at organizations (e.g., the cultural 
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context, cross-cutting culture, and sub-culture), (4) deconstructing the 
meaning of the culture for an organization’s employees, and (5) testing 
the applicability of theories of intercultural communication to hybrid 
forms of work. 
 Such research could help build a more holistic picture by looking, for 
example, at the change in organizational culture at incubators and hubs 
over time or at how individuals inside and outside of them construct or 
perceive their cultural infl uences. Watkins et al. ( 2012 ) have argued that 
“NGOs are shaped as much by how they are imagined as by what they 
actually do.” How do start-up managers perceive the incubators and tech 
hubs? How would members of an organization’s advisory board charac-
terize it? How might this characterization change depending on whom 
they are talking to? 
 Closer examination of the relationship between these organizations 
and the industrial and cultural context in which they exist could also 
prove very fruitful. Do the incubators and tech hubs in Kenya, as I 
speculate in this chapter, really have any power to shape the organi-
zational cultures of the start-ups they work with or the institutional 
norms being adopted by the country’s tech industry as a whole? Is there 
something theoretically useful to be learned from studying organiza-
tions forming in new industries like the Kenyan tech industry that 
might be applicable more broadly? 
 Finally, I believe that the study of intercultural communication could pro-
vide a particularly fruitful avenue for research on these kinds of hybrid orga-
nizational cultures in multicultural environments. Researchers specializing in 
intercultural communication have typically focused on environments with 
a mix of national cultures, like foreign language classrooms or among stu-
dents who study abroad. By taking some of the theories that were developed 
in these contexts—like cross-cultural competence, cultural intelligence, or 
code-switching—and applying them to the study of culture at organizations, 
researchers could help in a number of ways. Th ey could build theory about 
how hybrid organizations interact with one another or with nonhybrid orga-
nizations or test the value of hiring hybrid employees with experience work-
ing in various diff erent organizational cultural environments. 
 Nonprofi t, for-profi t, and hybrid organizations are likely to be part of 
Kenya’s tech sector for a while. And as in any environment where cultural 
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groups are forced to live together, there is the potential for confl ict. It is 
my hope that highlighting the areas in which these organizational groups 
overlap culturally and drawing attention to the fl uidity of culture, as this 
chapter has done, will help individuals in the sector acknowledge the 
areas of common ground between them and to use them to facilitate 
easier communication during the many intercultural interactions that 
take place on a daily basis in this diverse sector. 
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 Conversation #10 
 Refl ections on the Hiring Process: What 
Happened to Curiosity and Passion? 
 Conrad Akunga of Innova Limited 
 Conrad Akunga  is an enthusiastic, optimistic cynic, thinker, developer, son of 
Kenya, and all-round good guy with a keen interest in governance, economics, 
technology, and human nature. He has worked with technology for more than 
15 years and does not see that changing in the immediate future. He is a co-
founder of several initiatives, the main ones being Innova Limited, a pan-Afri-
can software company that develops analytics and tools for the investment and 
capital markets, and  www.mzalendo.com , a digital governance platform that 
provides nonpartisan insights into Kenya’s government and administration. 
 Why did you start Innova, and what is the story behind it? 
 Before I started Innova, I worked for a software company that developed 
supply chain software solutions for almost ten years. We developed client–
server applications running on mobile devices before there was Android. 
Before there was iOS. Before there was even 3G. Or Edge. It got to the point 
where I felt I knew the space and the issues like the back of my hand. In that 
capacity, I led a team that won the 2011 Growth Economy Venture Challenge, 
a million-dollar award from Nokia. But over time, I grew bored working 
in a space I knew so well and wanted a new challenge. So I partnered with 
my longtime friend Vincent Ntalami and went into a space I knew nothing 
about—fi nance and capital  markets. We started offi  cially in 2011, developing 
a range of fi nancial software and tools for the capital markets. Today, we have 
20 full-time staff , and we develop solutions for custodians, fund managers, 
private equity fi rms, and insurance and pension managers. We have clients in 
fi ve countries—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Malawi. 
 Entrepreneurship in Africa is quite hyped at the moment. How do 
you see this development? 
 I feel it is unfortunate. Entrepreneurship is considerably romanticized 
and glorifi ed. Nothing is hotter and sexier than entrepreneurship. Th e 
current ethos is that entrepreneurship is the solution to all our problems. 
I could not disagree more. I agree that entrepreneurship is important, but 
entrepreneurship is not the Holy Grail or the solution to all our problems. 
We cannot all be employers. We also need employees. As a matter of fact, 
employers and employees exist for the exact same reasons. Take the parallel 
of the armed forces. You cannot have an army of all generals. You also can-
not have an army of all noncommissioned offi  cers. Each element brings 
something to the table, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 Perhaps this new narrative is a knee-jerk response to the atmosphere 
we have been brought up in. For generations, kids have been told the 
following: go to primary school, work hard so you can go to a good 
secondary school, work hard so you can go to a good university, and 
fi nally work hard so you can get a good job. Generations and generations 
conditioned in this fashion have led to an education system optimized 
around producing employees, which, in turn, produces graduates who 
seek jobs. Th at is the demand side—employment. However, not much 
used to happen on the supply side—entrepreneurship. Perhaps that is 
332 C. Akunga
why the entrepreneurship narrative is getting such a reaction. It is the 
complete antithesis of the status quo. 
 Th e other issue I feel we have with the education system is its outright 
bias toward science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). 
Do not get me wrong—I think STEM is very important. But I also feel that 
the humanities, arts, and physical education are just as important. Again our 
kids have been conditioned to grow up to become doctors and engineers. 
In Kenya, the exit point from primary school is a nationwide examination 
called the Kenya Certifi cate of Primary Education. Millions of students 
appear for this exam around November, and by January, the results are out. 
Th ere is generally much fanfare, and the highest-scoring students are identi-
fi ed, celebrated, and interviewed. And every year,  without fail, these kids 
are asked what they want to be when they are done with education. Th ey 
invariably respond with some variation on doctor, surgeon, engineer. I can-
not recall ever hearing any of these kids say they want to be poets or dancers 
or artists. In our schools, a smart kid is one who is good at math or science; 
a kid who is good at drawing, curiously, is referred to as “talented.” But not 
smart. For society as a whole to fl ourish, each of these disciplines brings 
something to the table. We need STEM. But we also need arts. And physical 
sciences. And humanities. A holistic approach to our development capacity. 
 How will more “curious” students graduate from the education system? 
 I have always felt that the really good teachers can only be truly recog-
nized after they have left their students to themselves. Allow me to explain 
what I mean by that. Given that our education system is optimized around 
passing exams, anyone with a good memory can cram facts and dates and 
regurgitate them at exam time. But knowing facts and understanding and 
internalizing them is a diff erent kettle of fi sh. Good teachers plant a seed in 
your head, and usually you are blissfully unaware of it. Th ey instil curios-
ity. Curiosity is what will make you go to the library and look for books on 
how electricity works. Not because there is an exam or because you have 
been asked to. You have gone on your own because you simply want to 
know. Th ings you learn out of curiosity, or genuine passion, stick in your 
head a lot longer than those bullet points you crammed to pass an exam 
and almost immediately forgot. Th is model of a teacher standing in front, 
rapping out notes, and then students regurgitating the same notes back 
at them during exams needs to be reviewed. I have interviewed  software 
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developers and architects for almost 15 years now, and I am simultane-
ously saddened and amused by the number of graduates, masters, and 
even postgraduate prospects who have no clue about even the most basic 
fundamentals of computer science. What then does your degree prove 
other than that you know how to pass exams? What is it worth if you 
cannot access what you claim you know? It is a tragedy on so many levels. 
 How do you ﬁ lter out job candidates that can apply and not only 
repeat what they have learned? 
 For starters, I no longer care whether anyone has a degree. As a matter 
of fact, for some positions, a degree paradoxically seems to get in the way. 
A degree seems to install some kind of thoughts barriers (justifi ed or not), 
and I want a mindset that either does not realize there are any barriers or 
ignores them completely. Th ere is a lot to be said for dreamers and the 
doggedly determined who are not held back by reality. 
 Just like our education system, the interview process is also broken. 
Take the usual hiring situation… 
 I nterviewer : Tell us about yourself. 
 I nterviewee : My name is Mary. I am a hard-working, God-fearing 
citizen. 
 I nterviewer : Tell us about your past jobs. 
 I nterviewee : Currently I work at…. 
 I nterviewer : What are your strengths? 
 I nterviewee : I am a team player. I work well under pressure. I require 
minimal supervision. 
 I nterviewer : What are your weaknesses? 
 I nterviewee : I am a perfectionist. 
 It is as if there were a universal template—literally dozens of interviews 
where I have heard the same things. At Innova, we used this model for many 
years until we had some particularly disastrous hires who interviewed well 
but not only performed poorly, they but actually retrogressed us. We real-
ized that it is impossible to know if someone will be good at their job during 
the interview. Some people interview well and fl ounder. What if there were 
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people who interviewed poorly but would have turned out to be excep-
tional? So we changed it. We use the interview to get to know you, and vice 
versa. We sell you our vision and expectations. You do the same. Meet our 
team and your potential colleagues. What are your interests? What are you 
passionate about? Convince us to give you a chance, not a job. After this, 
you work for three months. How good are you at the job? Are you a team 
player? Are you pleasant to work with? Do you enjoy the work? Can you 
manage yourself and your time? Are you willing to pull together and pitch 
in during emergencies? We do not enforce offi  cial working hours, so these 
things matter. After these three months, your colleagues and your head of 
department vote whether to keep you or not. Any negative votes—no hire. 
After all, if your colleagues do not want to work with you, how useful can 
you be in a collective eff ort? It has worked extremely well for us. 
 How many people do you ﬁ nd that ﬁ t the proﬁ le of a creative  problem 
solver? 
 It is very diffi  cult to fi nd those, because almost all software developers 
come with the mindset that their primary work is to write code. Th is is not 
true. Th eir primary work is to understand and solve problems. Writing code 
just happens to be one of the tools at their disposal. Th e other problem is 
that they come in as Java guys. Or C++ guys. Or C# guys. Th ey do not come 
in as programmers. Th e programming language is neither here nor there. 
What is important is the knowledge and understanding of algorithms and 
data structures. Syntax and organization of source code is a book or a google 
away. Mindset and attitude are the most important things. Are you curious? 
Determined? Passionate? Driven? If so, most of the war is won. Th e techni-
cal stuff  we can teach you. However, we cannot teach you the former. My 
old boss Francis Kioko once told me that the fi rst thing you should do when 
you take on a new job or opportunity is to train your replacement. At the 
time, that made no sense to me, because it sounded like career suicide. But 
with age came wisdom, and I understood that much as I could try to impart 
all of my technical knowledge, what I could not impart, even if I wanted to, 
was my experience—how to apply said knowledge: Th at is your edge! You 
cannot study this by cramming and repeating what you have read. You need 
to start trying and learning by applying knowledge. We are looking for those 
who know how to put their knowledge to work. 
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 Hustling is very prominent in Kenya. What is your opinion on the 
“hustling” entrepreneur? 
 It depends. If hustling is a temporary and reactionary move, in excep-
tional circumstances, then it makes sense. If it is the end of the month 
and you do not have the cash fl ow for payroll, how can you temporarily 
address that situation? Aggressive negotiation? Overdraft? Short-term con-
sultancy? If, however, hustling is your standard mode of operation, then 
you have a big problem. It is not sustainable or scalable. You will be spread 
too thin. You will not be focused. And that is bad for you, your employees, 
and your company. Here, hustling is a bad thing. Structure, planning, and 
process are essential for scaling and growth. Th e dubious badge of honour 
carried by those who are permanent hustlers needs to be retired. If you are 
constantly hustling, you have fundamental problems. Fix them. 
 Let us imagine you could start Innova all over again. What would you 
change? 
 I have been asked this several times, and I used to answer, “I should 
have started sooner.” But again, with age comes wisdom. If I had started 
sooner, would I have had the experiences and lessons that shaped my 
thinking and attitude today? Because learning includes both the things 
you should do and the things you should not. All of these played a part 
to make me who I am today. And so I can answer confi dently that, with 
hindsight, I would not change a thing! 
 Th ank you, Conrad! 
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